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and the Legal Curriculum 
Dr Paul Maharg 
Abstract 
The focus of this chapter initially is the educational writings of Carl Rogers and the relevance of them 
to contemporary legal education. Rogers could be described as an extreme example of pragmatist 
philosophy in action, focusing as he does upon the primacy of experience, and can therefore be cited 
as one sympathetic to many of the aims of Dewey in the American pragmatist tradition.  His work is 
part of the tradition of humanist education, yet his views also sit well beside a number of 
contemporary educational and cognitive research directions, all of which have relevance for the 
teaching and learning of law.  In this chapter I shall put forward two arguments.  First, I shall argue 
that Rogers, seldom cited in legal educational literature, has relevance for those involved with legal 
skills education. Perhaps more significantly, his views on the differences between teaching and 
learning  re-surface in contemporary theory on learning processes, especially constructivist theories 
and phenomenographical methodologies, which similarly focus on the learning experience.  Secondly, 
and on a wider front, I would argue that both Rogers and constructivism lead us to consider issues 
which are not only at the heart of educational debates, but are the concerns of jurisprudence as well.  
In this respect I hope that the chapter will illustrate the overlap between jurisprudence and legal 
education, and the extent to which educational issues (particularly epistemological ones) are also 
jurisprudential ones. 
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Carl Rogers and education 
One of the earliest and most important of Rogers‟ statements on education is his 
„Personal Thoughts on Teaching and Learning‟.1  First delivered in 1952 at a 
conference in Harvard during a session on „Classroom Approaches to Influencing 
Human Behavior‟, and widely circulated, then published in 1957, this 
controversial piece was extensively re-published, not only in collections of Rogers‟ 
work, but in major collections of educational literature.2   
The text is a radical educational version of what has come to be known as 
Rogerian, or person-centred modes of learning.  It is declaratory, a manifesto of 
sorts, though uttered in a private voice, and ending with the very antithesis of a 
peroration.  It is not an essay but a conference paper and was not subsequently 
revised for publication.  It is barely more than three pages in length; it begins 
with puzzlement and ends abruptly by asking his readers to reflect on the effect 
his argument has had on them.  „Argument‟ is not quite the right word, 
suggesting continuous prose and an array of rhetorical devices appropriate to that 
form.  There is no formal set of arguments, no logical pattern in extended prose: 
aphorisms are perhaps the closest form to describe the statements Rogers makes, 
which at times are almost like Wilde‟s epigrams on teaching and learning.3  The 
text belongs to the tradition of aphoristic literature in philosophy, literature and 
education – Bacon‟s Essays rather than the Bacon of the Novum Organon, the 
later rather than the earlier Wittgenstein, Adorno‟s Minima Moralia rather than the 
systematic work of Horkheimer. Yet, as with the aphoristic tradition generally, the 
brevity of the argumentative unit belies the depth of perception which lies in each 
aphorism, and the extent to which the network of sayings or statements build 
upon each other to give a coherent view of the educational process.  The form, in 
other words, says much about the content of the text. 
When first delivered at an educational conference in Harvard in 1952, the paper 
provoked a highly critical debate among the teachers and educationalists present.  
It is not difficult to see why this was so, given that at the time, the dominant 
paradigm in educational psychology was behaviourism.  Four years before Miller‟s 
important paper on memory and the information processing model, and twelve 
years before Chomsky‟s famous rebuttal of behaviourist linguistics (Miller 1956, 
Chomsky 1964), Rogers rejected the core assumptions of the behaviourist project 
quite explicitly in this paper.  He does so by distinguishing between „learning‟ on 
the one hand, and „behaviour‟ on the other, and opposing the behaviourist 
reduction of the learning context to stimulus-response theory (s-r) is denied in 
points b. and d.: 
b. It seems to me that anything that can be taught to another is 
relatively inconsequential and has little or no significant influence on 
behavior.  
[…] 
                                                          
1 Rogers 1957.  Further reference to this text is included in the body of the chapter. 
2 See, eg, Rogers 1969, 151-6  
3 See for example Wilde 1894 
 3 
d. I have come to feel that the only learning which significantly 
influences behavior is self-discovered, self-appropriated learning. (p.302)4 
 
Having stated this he goes on to explore what are for him the consequences of 
taking seriously „self-discovered, self-appropriated learning‟.  This leads him to a 
rejection of explicit teaching which seeks to „influence behavior‟ in favour of a 
model of facilitative communication in which the teacher becomes a learner 
primarily, either individually or in groups.  This model, based upon facilitation, 
leads Rogers to fairly radical conclusions regarding some familiar landmarks in 
the curriculum.  As he confesses, with some irony, „[it] is when I realize the 
implications that I shudder a bit at the distance I have come from the 
commonsense world that everyone knows is right‟ (p.303).  Teaching, 
examinations, grades, credits, degrees and the exposition of conclusions – all this 
would be abolished.  At this point, Rogers breaks off – „I do not want to become 
too fantastic‟ (p.303). 
The points Rogers makes appear at first to have little relevance to legal 
education. It is difficult to imagine a curriculum in law which is not based upon 
examinations and grades, while the essence of the legal case-book is the 
„exposition of conclusions‟, which Rogers regards as being of little worth to 
learners.  But Rogers has a lot to say about the experience of learning which is 
relevant legal learning.  In point h., for instance, he declares that the results of 
his own attempts to teach were that either „damage was done‟ or „nothing 
significant occurred‟ (p.302).  As a result, point i. goes on to state „I realize that I 
am only interested in being a learner, preferably learning things that matter, that 
have some significant influence on my own behavior‟(p.302).5  Rogers is taking 
issue here with the concept of „teaching‟ as heavily didactic, and with teaching as 
transmission of knowledge.  Whether or not we agree that the results of this type 
of teaching are either insignificant or damaging, his point applies profoundly to 
student motivation, as the research on this subject confirms.6  It also applies to 
continuing professional development education where, if the learning is carried 
out using authentic activities, then the experience of point j. in Rogers‟ argument 
comes about: „I find it very rewarding to learn‟ (p.302).  Points k. and l. go on to 
explore what it is that makes learning rewarding.  Once again, Rogers eschews 
the s-r model of grades and penalties, and examines his own experience of 
learning:  
k. I find that one of the best, but most difficult, ways for me to learn 
is to drop my own defensiveness, at least temporarily, and to try to 
understand the way in which his experience seems and feels to the other 
person. 
l. I find that another way of learning for me is to state my own 
uncertainties, to try to clarify my puzzlements, and thus get closer to the 
meaning that my experience actually seems to have.  (pp.302-3) 
 
                                                          
4 Emphasis in original 
5
 Emphasis in original 
6
 See, for example, Paris & Turner 1994 
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Point k. finds its parallel, in legal education, within much of the literature on legal 
skills learning, particularly on client interviewing and counselling.7  Topics such 
as dropping the defensiveness of the mask of expertise and engaging with and 
negotiating the client‟s fears and anxieties is central to much of this literature, 
and it leads on to an acknowledgement of the role of point l. in professional 
learning (Brayne 1998).  Point l. also has relevance for undergraduate legal 
learning.  Rogers draws attention to what has become known as „metacognition‟, 
the process by which learners reflect on and control their learning.8  It is one way 
of articulating what Schön, Eraut, Barnett and other educationalists were later to 
explore as aspects of „knowledge-in-action‟.9   
It is significant that the only reference Rogers makes to another author is to 
Søren Kierkegaard: what Rogers gives us is in one sense an existential view of 
education, one which relies heavily on his firmly held view that teachers and 
therapists achieve most when they are attentive, as facilitators, to the learning 
experience, rather than overt teachers.10 Such a view of education is present in 
the rest of his educational and clinical writings.  As he says in his essay „The 
Interpersonal Relationship in the Facilitation of Learning‟, „if we focused on the 
facilitation of learning -- how, why, and when the student learns, and how 
learning seems and feels from the inside -- we might be on a much more 
profitable track‟ (Rogers 1967b, p.16).11 
This experiential approach is of a piece with his view of the therapeutic 
relationship.  As he says in On Becoming a Person: 
„[e]xperience is, for me, the highest authority.  The touchstone of validity 
is my own experience.  No other person‟s ideas, and none of my own 
ideas, are as authoritative as my experience.  ...  My experience is not 
authoritative because it is infallible.  It is the basis of authority because it 
can always be checked in new primary ways.  In this way its frequent 
error or fallibility is always open to correction.‟ (Rogers 1967, p.26) 
 
This passage is interesting because of the contrast Rogers draws.  First there is 
the assertion of the primacy of individual experience.  But Rogers does not leave 
it there: if he did, he would be open to the accusation of naïve solipsism.  He 
goes on to distinguish between experience as authority, and experience as 
authoritative in an objective way.  Clearly he rejects the latter.  Indeed (and 
with a typically Rogerian inversion) it is because experience is the „highest 
authority‟ that it is fallible, and must be „always open to correction‟. 
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 See for example Le Brun and Johnstone 1994, Maughan and Webb 1995, Webb and Maughan, 1996, Brayne, 
Duncan and Grimes, 1998. 
8
 Flavell (1976) describes it as follows: ‘Metacognition refers to one's knowledge concerning one's own cognitive 
processes or anything related to them, e.g., the learning-relevant properties of information or data’.  See also 
Forrest-Pressly et al. 1985, and McAleese 1985 
9
 For instance Schön 1983, Schön 1987, Eraut 1994, Barnett 1992 
10
 In the retrospective notes added to this essay in his later volume Freedom to Learn, Rogers commented that 
‘*i+f the style, and the attempt to be as honest as possible, smacks of Kierkegaard, this is not a coincidence.  I 
had spent much of my time on this trip [to Mexico, where the paper was written] reading, digesting and 
appreciating his work’ (Rogers 1969, p.151).  In these comments Rogers also notes that this paper was the first 
in which he articulated for himself the distinctions between teaching and learning. 
11
 Reprinted in Kirshenbaum and Henderson 1989,304-22, p.320 
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The passage is in one sense a more radical version of Dewey‟s pragmatic 
emphasis upon experience.  Rogers acknowledged the influence of Dewey and 
Kilpatrick in his early seminal period at Rochester (Kirschenbaum 1979, p.95).   
Indeed Rogers acknowledges the debt to Dewey in one of his own favourite 
essays, „The necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change‟ 
when he describes the crucial concept of unconditional positive regard: „[i]t 
means that there are no conditions of acceptance [of the client], no feeling of “I 
like you only if you are thus and so.”  It means a „prizing‟ of the person, as 
Dewey has used that term‟ (Rogers 1957b, p.100).12   
This essay, as with much of Rogers‟ work, concentrates on ways in which the 
client (not the „patient‟: the lexical substitution is acute in describing the change 
of relationship) can be prized by being accepted and listened to.  Empathy plays 
a key role.  As he describes it in another book,  
[empathy] includes communicating your sensings of [the client‟s] world as 
you look with fresh and unfrightened eyes at elements of which the 
individual is fearful.  It means frequently checking with him/her as to the 
accuracy of your sensings, and being guided by the responses you receive.  
You are a confident companion to the person in his/her inner world. 
(Rogers 1980, p.142) 
For Rogers, what mattered was not so much the categorising of illness and mental 
condition, and the belief of objective reality which underlay such practice, but the 
perception of reality as possessed by the client.  prizing and empathy were key 
affective and experiential components of the relationship between counseller and 
client in which, in contrast to much current therapeutic practice, Rogers was able 
to explore the „inner world‟ of the client precisely by being not an alienating and 
authoritative expert, but a „confident companion‟.  The language of this extract is 
of a piece with the extract above where Rogers writes of „checking‟ the fallibility of 
his own experiential perception.   
It is a phenomenology of sorts, a deep concern with the way that the world is 
perceived, and how those perceptions affect subsequent behaviour and perception 
of experience.  All this is present, if not on the page then certainly in the 
conceptual structures that underlie the aphorisms, in „Personal Thoughts on 
Teaching and Learning‟.  As we shall see, they are not too far removed from 
aspects of contemporary educational theory, in particular constructivism.   
Constructivism 
Such is the debate about its central concepts that constructivism could perhaps 
be construed as a body of theories about the learning processes.13.  Perhaps 
most basic is the idea that learning is an active process within which learners are 
constantly constructing thought which always springs from their own experience 
and structures of thought.  Constructivism is intensely learner-centred: what 
learners know, what they need to know next and how they might begin to 
understand assimilate such new knowledge is focus of constructivist design.   
The concept is not confined to educational psychology.  More broadly, it is part of 
a general trend in the humanities and social sciences towards exploring the place 
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 Reprinted in Kirschenbaum and Henderson 1989, 219-35, p.225 
13 The literature is considerable.  For an introduction, see Bransford and Vye 1989, 
Forman and Pufall 1989, Honebein, Duffy and Fishman 1993, Lebow 1993.   
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of connectionist (Rummelhart and McClelland 1986), social constructivist (Bruffee 
1986), antifoundationalist (Phillips 1995, Winn 1993) and similar sociocultural 
approaches to knowledge and society (Confrey 1995).  In terms of educational 
psychology, there is an irony here, of course: few theories of educational design 
have provoked such powerful conceptual responses, both for and against, from 
such a variety of communities: psychologists, educationalists, philosophers, 
narratologists, and specialised educationalists from almost every professional 
educational field.  But if the theory and its consequences are controversial, there 
is general agreement on the three assumptions underlying almost all 
constructivist positions, which are as follows. 
i. Knowledge Construction and disciplinary communities. 
Constructivists emphasise that knowledge is not received from external sources, 
but is generated, often by contact with external stimuli, from individual 
understanding.  From this knowledge base, and the changes brought about 
within it by constantly-evolving experience, stems understanding of the world.  
There is thus no guarantee that there will be any direct correspondence between 
an external concept presented to the individual, and the concept as it is 
understood by the individual.14   
But if individuals all interpret the world differently, then constructivists require to 
account for commonly-held and accepted understandings of percepts.  They do 
so by relying on the social negotiation of meaning, which is „supported by 
collaborative construction of knowledge‟ (Jonassen et al 1993, p.233). Both 
points, constructivists would argue, hold important consequences for learning and 
teaching.  First, if all individuals interpret and learn differently, teachers require 
to learn how they can support such difference in learning.  Secondly, if social 
negotiation of meaning within disciplinary communities is important for the 
transfer of meaning, then students require to be inducted into what one might 
regard as the syntax of the community, its attitudes, logical forms, genres, 
procedures and belief systems, as well as what one might regard as its 
substantive content.  Thirdly, co-operation, rather than isolation, in learning 
becomes a powerful heuristic.   
If individual understanding arises only from individual perception, then it would 
appear difficult for constructivism to account for the transfer of learning from an 
understanding of individual percept (eg an example or instance of a rule) to an 
understanding of the more generic precept (that is, the rule itself).15  This is an 
important criticism of any learning theory, particularly one which puts so much 
emphasis, as constructivism does, upon individual understandings of the 
perceptual world.  Constructivists counter it by giving a phenomenological 
account of the inter-relations of individual experiences.  Jonassen et al, for 
instance, cites Hannabuss (1992) for whom „understandings are part of a 
referential hierarchy in which personal “stories” subsume concepts which in turn 
subsume propositions‟ (p.235).  If there are no meaningful contexts to a learning 
event, then the move from percept to precept is made more difficult for learners 
for whom there is therefore no referential context.  The environment of learning 
thus takes on added importance: case-studies, realia, simulations, clinical 
environments are examples of these.  This argument, however, has not satisfied 
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 There is a clear parallel here between this point of view and Rogers’ view concerning the exposition of 
conclusions to learners 
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 For a full discussion of this with reference not to constructivism but to situated cognition, see Laurillard 1992, 
pp.19-28 
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the critics of constructivist theory, many of whom, such as Laurillard, are 
sceptical of the claims made about the power of contextual learning to move from 
percept to precept.  It could be argued that this point in the constructivist 
argument is the most contentious, and the one most open to rebuttal.16   
ii. Constructivist and Rogerian theory. 
Many of the traits outlined above, of course, are not unique to constructivism 
alone.  They are shared by other learning strategies: situated cognition, cognitive 
apprenticeships and realia are some examples of this (Grabinger and Dunlap 
1995).17  Constructivism differs in that it strongly links the epistemological 
grounds of the theory to classroom heuristics.  Many instructional design 
approaches to knowledge acquisition acknowledge the variability of learning 
styles and experience that students bring to the task of education; but do not 
give central place in their design to these variations.  Robert Gagné‟s 
instructional design is an example of this which, as Steve Draper rightly observes, 
is „strictly top down.  It takes instructional objectives and subdivides them in a 
top down fashion, ending up with a set of small items, for each of which a 
separate instructional action is taken.  This is like the design methods that used 
to be taught in computer science, but are now largely discredited even there.‟ 
(Draper 1997).  Draper‟s criticism of Gagné, in a Web IT Forum discussion with 
one of Gagné‟s proponents, Dave Merrill, casts useful light on the constructivist 
debate.  Draper points out that a top down model „only works in domains where 
each part of the problem can be solved independently, and the solution to one 
part has no effect on the solution to another part.‟ (ibid).  But even here there 
are difficulties with instructional designs which are overly programmatic: „if an 
instructor convinces himself they are independent, this does not make it any 
more likely that they are independent in the mind of the learner...  It just means 
the instructor is designing for himself, not for the learner.‟  Draper goes on to 
point out that instructional actions as well as knowledge items „may have multiple 
effects‟ and that therefore „the relationships here are many to many, and no top 
down design procedure can cope.‟ (ibid).   
It has to be said that Draper is not arguing the constructivist corner here; but his 
arguments against forms of instructional design are a useful illustration of the 
power of the constructivist position, starting as it does from strong and 
transparent presuppositions about the epistemological status of learning and 
understanding.  From this springs the extent to which the mediational role of 
individual experience is emphasised, and the consequent use of heavily 
contextualised teaching and learning strategies.  In this sense it could be argued 
that, more than other learning theorists, constructivists follow through the logic of 
starting from what the learner knows: this includes what the learner knows of the 
learning process.   
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 Petraglia (1998) discusses this in depth.  He recasts the problem as the constructivists’ need for ‘authenticity’ 
in learning 
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 It is interesting to note that Dewey’s use of the concept of ‘situation’ is close in a number of respects to 
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social continuity as held in memory between different episodes: ‘*d+ifferent situations succeed one another.  But 
because of the principle of continuity something is carried over from the earlier to the later ones’ (Dewey 1938 
p.37).  In many respects this is similar to Rogers’ concept of the primacy of experience. 
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It also takes into account what the teacher knows of the learning process.  
Constructivist learning requires careful curriculum planning, from general to 
specifics and between each component of the curriculum.  This is one reason why 
Draper (no constructivist, though sympathetic to constructivist concerns) argues 
against top-down design procedures: 
I am not against setting explicit goals systematically, and indeed refining 
them down into small pieces. But I am interested in whether existing 
design methods then draw the false though apparently sensible inference 
that the pieces can then be addressed independently. A good test is 
whether any piece of instruction relates to more than one objective: in 
reality I sometimes learn more than one thing from a single learning 
event. (ibid) 
Here as elsewhere in this debate Draper appeals to a hermeneutic sense of the 
learning experience.  This is not a naïve holism, but a sense of interconnection 
within the elements that go to make up the learning experience: a learning 
ecology of sorts, where the quality of the learning environment is crucial.   
There are clear similarities between what Rogers advocates in his radical essay, 
and the constructivist understanding of the learning process.  Both question the 
value of direct teaching; and both advocate, in Rogers‟ terms, „self-discovered, 
self-appropriated learning‟ and the replacement of overtly didactic instructional 
strategies with the „facilitation of significant learning‟.18  Both rely on an 
epistemology which emphasises the process of knowing and learning rather than 
the object of knowledge to be learned. 
Between these two positions in the field of educational enquiry, therefore, there 
can be drawn a number of lines of similarity, a conceptual genealogy which 
crosses the disciplines of psychology (person-centred counselling and cognitive 
science) and education, and traditions of thought within those disciplines.  At a 
more basic level, there are also similarities of epistemological concern.  Both 
Rogers and constructivists would agree on the necessity for educational theory to 
take account of epistemological method and construct: Rogers, because his 
epistemology is grounded less in theory and much more in experience and 
practice, as is constructivist learning design, and constructivism because of the 
felt need of constructivists to return to the fundamental question of what 
constitutes learning.  As a result of the epistemological enquiry they carry out, 
both Rogers and constructivists reach conclusions about educational method that 
are often regarded as controversial.  There are of course differences in 
methodology and in practice between Rogers and constructivist educational 
practice.  Nevertheless, we can see a similar move to enquire at a deep level into 
the nature of understanding and the status of knowledge; followed by a 
movement from epistemological enquiry to putting the results of this enquiry into 
practice in the classroom.  This characteristic movement has two important 
implications for legal education which we shall consider below: the relationship of 
educational theory to practice, and the working-out of this relationship within the 
legal curriculum.   
Theory and practice: the symbiotic relationship 
If the changes advocated by Rogers and constructivism are to come about, it is 
necessary first, for all legal educators, no matter what their status and role within 
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the law school, to be aware of the epistemological and educational theories which 
their practice as law teachers embody; and for this reflexive awareness to have 
an effect on their practice as educators.19  Such a symbiosis of theory and 
practice is precisely what a number of educationalists have advocated should 
occur if quality in teaching and learning is to improve.  Paul Ramsden for 
example, drawing upon research carried out by, among others Margaret Balla, 
Gloria Dall‟Alba and Elaine Martin into lecturers‟ structures of theory and beliefs 
about teaching, has proposed that, broadly speaking, teachers in higher 
education hold one of three generic theories of the role of the teacher.  Theory 
one is „Teaching as telling or transmission‟, where teaching is defined as „the 
transmission of authoritative content or the demonstration of procedures‟ 
(Ramsden 1992, p.111).  Theory two, transitional between one and three, is 
„Teaching as organising student activity‟ where student learning is seen as 
problematic, and where teaching is „seen as a supervision process involving the 
articulation of techniques designed to ensure that students learn‟ (ibid., p.113).  
Theory three, „Teaching as making learning possible‟, treats teaching and learning 
as complementary activities, „a process of working co-operatively with learners to 
help them change their understanding‟ (ibid., p.114).  As Ramsden observes, this 
theory is based on a „different epistemology‟ from theories one and two: „[i]t is 
recognised that knowledge of the subject content is actively constituted by the 
learner‟ (ibid., p.114).  As a result, theory three „extends the understanding of 
teaching so that it becomes embedded in the nature of subject knowledge and the 
nature of how it is learned‟ (ibid., p.116).  Ramsden clearly views theory three as 
superior to theories one and two, and he is in no doubt that the adoption of 
theory three is a necessary precondition for higher quality in teaching and 
learning: 
it [theory three] represents the goal towards which all efforts at improving 
teaching in higher education should be directed.  Changing lecturers‟ 
understanding of teaching is a necessary condition for improving teaching 
in higher education. (ibid, p.117) 
 
If theory is important to practice, how might legal educators go about research 
into their practice?  Rogers provides little in the way of direction here.  Instead, 
we could apply to an important line of contemporary research in educational 
psychology which stems from the same phenomenological roots as Rogers‟ work, 
namely phenomenography.  This movement in educational psychology grew out 
of dissatisfaction with existing forms of research into learning, and with the 
cognitive models which stemmed from of this research.  It was based in centres 
in Sweden (University of Göteborg) and the UK (Lancaster, Edinburgh, Surrey 
universities), and is associated with (in Sweden) Ference Marton, Lars-Owe 
Dahlgren, Roger Säljö, Lennart Svensson, and in the UK, Noel Entwistle, Diana 
Laurillard, Paul Ramsden and Dai Hounsell.  It has been described as „hard-nosed 
phenomenology‟ (Marton et al 1997, p.vii), and consists of intensive interviews 
with students which are analysed, and sometimes followed up by statistical 
analysis of posttest results.20   
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The results of this research often go to the heart of the student experience of 
higher education in a way that is strikingly similar to Rogers‟ insights.  This will 
be clear if we take one example of phenomenographical research, namely Marton 
and Säljö‟s work on students‟ reading strategies.  Marton and Säljö set out to 
discover what students actually did and felt when they were trying to learn from 
texts.  Students were interviewed, and then an iterative procedure of category 
analysis was used to separate different items and examine the relationships 
within the overall „”pool of meanings”‟ (Marton et al 1997, pp.42-3).  The reasons 
for the differences between student performance, they discovered, lay within 
students‟ self-perceptions as they read the texts – one group saw themselves as 
„empty vessels … to be filled with words on the page‟, while the second group saw 
themselves as „creators of knowledge who [had] to use their capabilities to make 
critical judgements‟ (ibid., p.43).  This is illustrated by quotes from the 
interviews.  From the first group –  
“... the only thing I was thinking about was that I‟d got to hurry.  What 
happened was that I read a couple of sentences and then I didn‟t 
remember what I‟d read because I was thinking all the time, „I‟ve got to 
hurry to get this done‟ ...  I kept on thinking that I‟d got to remember 
what I‟d just read, but (then I would wonder) „How am I going to 
remember this now‟.  „I won‟t remember anything‟ is what I thought more 
or less in several places.‟ (ibid, p.43) 
The above extract is a clear example of what would later be known generally as 
surface learning.21  In this example we can see researchers trying to understand 
how students study by researching the experience of learning.  They do so by 
examining the relations between students‟ conceptions of what a learning task 
demands of them.  As a result, many phenomenographers argue that one of the 
most efficient ways of improving student learning is to make the learners‟ 
conceptions explicit to them: „[t]he aim is for them to become conscious of the 
fact that there are different conceptions of the phenomena in question, and see 
what the conceptions are‟ (Marton and Ramsden 1988, p.277).  The approach to 
learning is strikingly similar to Rogers‟ approach to learning quoted in points k. 
and l. above (p.XXX), all the more so because phenomenology, in its findings and 
methodology, is applicable not only to the context of student learning but to 
teachers and their situation as well.  If, as Ramsden asserts, changing lecturers‟ 
understanding of teaching is necessary to improve teaching, then one way to do 
so is to promote the basic concepts of what we might call Rogerian metacognition 
(point l. above) and phenomenological methodology.  The phenomenological 
emphasis on the learning experience, the curiosity about what this entails, a 
refashioning of approaches to knowledge and how it can be learned most 
effectively -- epistemological issues such as these are seen as crucial by many 
educationalists.  As Laurillard put it, „[i]nculcating an appropriate conception of 
learning, or a desirable epistemology, is not an issue peculiar to the use of 
educational technology.  Clearly, it is fundamental to any kind of teaching‟ 
(p.214).  And in the Introduction to her book she declares: 
The system must change.  ...  Teachers need to know more than just 
their subject.  They need to know the ways it can come to be understood, 
the ways it can be misunderstood, what counts as understanding: they 
need to know how individuals experience the subject.  But they are 
neither required nor enabled to know these things.  Moreover, our system 
                                                          
21
 Marton sees a paradox at the heart of this type of awareness of failure: ‘*t+he students often have the feeling 
that they will not remember, just because they are trying so hard to remember ... (This most extreme form of 
concentrating on the surface of the presentation, characterised by a failure to learn due to over-anxiety to 
perform well, has been called hyperintention)’ (ibid, p.44) 
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of mass lectures and examinations ensures they will never find them out. 
(pp.3-4)22 
Laurillard‟s last statement is particularly acute.  Impediments to change are not 
merely personal: they are systemic and cultural within the university system and 
within the culture of a discipline as it is transmitted within a university.   
Rogers, constructivism and Jurisprudence 
This brings us to our second point.  If it is the case that change is thwarted not 
merely within the university system, but within the culture and attitudes of 
individual disciplines, then it makes sense that critique of this culture should be 
carried out not merely by educationalists such as Ramsden and Laurillard, 
operating from within their own disciplinary lines of research, but by historians, 
psychologists, philosophers, literary critics and lawyers, all working within their 
own disciplines and across disciplines.  Within law, there has recently been 
critique of traditional legal educational methods and attitudes.  This has come 
largely from those involved in clinical programmes and skills education, as well as 
those involved in  legal ethics, sociolegal and sociolinguistic enquiry.23  However, 
as we have seen, epistemology and other methodological tools such as 
hermeneutic enquiry are vital to many of these educational debates.  These 
forms of enquiry are also fundamental critical methodologies in jurisprudence, 
which is the traditional locus for both description and critique of legal culture.  
They have been applied to the historical culture of legal education -- Peter 
Goodrich‟s Languages of Law is one example, a text which critically examines „the 
paradigm of English law, the curriculum and method that emerged from the Inns 
of Court as a response to printing, to the Reformation and to the Renaissance 
vernacularisation of the disciplines and the sciences‟ (Goodrich 1990, p.20).  But 
it may well be the case that in jurisprudence classes, students do not employ 
these methodological tools to examine their own experience of the law and of 
learning the law.  I have no empirical data to support it as yet, but I would 
venture the proposition that legal education as a jurisprudential topos is relatively 
invisible, and that students‟ experiences of their education are rarely the focus of 
educational debate or jurisprudential enquiry within the classroom.   
And yet there is no reason why the experience of students as they are actually 
studying could not be a resource upon which jurisprudential analysis could draw 
in order to critique law.  Rogers‟ early paper recalls Kierkegaard, and early 
pragmatic debates around the concept of agency, as well as the power dynamic in 
any expert/novice relationship.  Schön‟s theory of reflective practice is one of a 
number of more recent explorations into how (legal) professionals think in 
practice, and thus -- as Steven Winter and others remind us -- contributes to 
Realist debates on the nature of law and legal practice in society (Winter 1989).  
The challenge of constructivism, as Petraglia (1998) makes clear, is one that 
reaches to the heart of the debates surrounding antifoundationalism, rhetoric and 
situated cognition.  Phenomenography as a research method raises questions 
also raised by Felstiner and Sarat, by sociolinguists and many others about how 
                                                          
22
 Others have made the same point.  See for instance John Bowden, who gives the point a peculiarly Rogerian 
cast: ‘*w+hat is required is for teachers themselves to undergo a learning process -- to change their conceptions of 
teaching’ (Bowden 1988, p.259) 
23
 See, for example, in the UK, the work of Webb, Maughan, and Brayne, cited in the references.  For US 
examples, see footnote 24 
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law is presented in society and practised by lawyers.24  These are only some of 
the many general epistemological issues which link education to jurisprudential 
critique, and which lie at the heart of theories of teaching and learning and the 
educational debates between these theories.  In their way, they contribute 
powerfully to our understanding of how law teachers constitute law and legal 
process in the law school, and thus contribute to the process and practice of law 
in society at large.   
To make them visible, we need to continue to do what Rogers advocated over 40 
years ago, namely give priority to the experience of what it is to be students and 
what it is to be a teacher.  Sociolinguistic analysis for example, applied typically 
to court practice and client/lawyer interactions, could be applied to classroom 
interactions more often than it has been in the past; while tools of textual and 
critical analysis, used to interpret and decode law and legal practice, could be 
used to demystify the experience of legal learning and its practice.  These lines of 
research are of a piece with Rogerian and constructivist methods.  Rogers, after 
all, was one of the first clinicians to exploit the technologies of audio- and 
videotape (Rogers 1942); and constructivists, as Petraglia points out prefer to 
rely on what he terms „found cognition (that is, thinking as it unfolds in natural 
contexts)‟ (Petraglia 1998, p.62).  Similarly, phenomenographic research into 
what actually happens when students learn the law would provide more valuable 
data on their learning experiences than decontextualised quantitative data of 
tightly-controlled experimental environments.25  It is a project Rogers and 
constructivists would almost certainly approve. 
Further Reading 
Rogers and education 
Kirschenbaum, Howard, and Henderson, Valerie Land (1990) (eds) Carl Rogers: 
Dialogues: Conversations with Martin Buber, Paul Tillich, B. F. Skinner, Gregory 
Bateson, Michael Polanyi, Rollo May, and Others, London: Constable 
Elliott-Kemp, John, Carl Rogers (1982) The Effective Teacher: A Person-centred 
Development Guide, Sheffield: PAVIC Publications 
For a useful introduction to the subject of existentialism and education, see David 
E. Denton (1974) ed., Existentialism and Phenomenology in Education: Collected 
Essays, New York: Teachers College Press 
                                                          
24
 The literature on this is extensive.  See for example Sarat 1991; Felstiner and Sarat 1988, 1992, 1995; 
Cunningham 1992; Kearns and Sarat 1994.   
25
 This applies as much to technology in the classroom as it does to more traditional legal educational methods.  
See for instance the findings of the Teaching with Independent Learning Technologies (TILT) Project in the 
University of Glasgow, which focused on the use and evaluation of IT to show how teaching and learning could be 
made more productive and efficient throughout a single university.  Most of their key findings as regards 
evaluation were carried out using observations, interviews and videotaping as well as pre- and post-test 
questionnaires and quizzes.  This broadly phenomenographic approach to learning evaluation led them to 
conclude, amongst other points, that ‘*s+ituational factors are critical - the role of the courseware within the 
course, its integration with other teaching components, the availability and use (and usefulness) of other learning 
resources: the influence of individual and social variables.’ (TILT 1997) 
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Constructivism: 
Perhaps the most recent survey of constructivist theory and history is Petraglia 
1998, cited below.  Key statements of theoretical positions are contained in 
Jonassen, David, Mayes, Terry, McAleese, Ray (1993), and Grabinger, Scott R. 
and Dunlap, Joanna C. (1995), all cited below.  The last article also has the 
advantage of giving a number of examples of constructivism in practice. A useful 
guide to the debates is contained in Duffy, T.M., and Jonassen, D. (1992) 
Constructivism and the Technology of Instruction: A Conversation, Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Phenomenography: 
For a position statement and guide to methodology, Marton and Booth 1997, cited 
below, is probably the most recent and comprehensive.  Marton et al 1997, also 
cited below, gives useful examples 
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